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ABSTRACT 
 
A widespread and commonly held belief is that a free and independent press fulfills a both signifi-
cant and important role in fighting corruption. In numerous policy proposals and general recom-
mendations, the importance of media plurality, media freedom and competition is emphasized in 
curbing corruption. Nonetheless, the knowledge as to how effective media and a free press actually 
perform to combat corruption is still limited, albeit growing. 
This working paper demonstrates that research on the relationship between press freedom and 
corruption is far from completed, and that additional and new approaches are required to move 
forward. Here, we combine two different models of the relationship between press freedom and 
corruption and bring forward more and improved data, including indicators of press freedom, and 
a number of different measures of corruption. In addition, we apply new estimation techniques to 
analyze our data. Based on these estimation techniques, it is therefore feasible to handle known 
problems that arise when estimating models with time-invariant or almost time-invariant variables 
correlated with unit effects. Similar techniques have not yet been applied in previous research on 
the relationship between press freedom and corruption. Thus, our application will serve as a ro-
bustness test of earlier findings. 
The results stress the importance of looking beyond the simple models of direct effects of press 
freedom and the level of corruption, as the relationship seems to be more complicated than that. 
Our results show that the role of a free press in fighting corruption differs depending on whether 
the country at play has a well, newly, or non-established electoral democracy. The effect of press 
freedom on corruption starts off negative or insignificant for countries with very low levels of de-
mocracy, and becomes more positive the more democratic a country is.  
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A widespread and commonly held belief is that a free and independent press fulfills a both signifi-
cant and important role in fighting corruption. International organizations, such as the World Bank 
and Transparency International, regard media and a free press as one of the major solutions in 
curbing corruption. In numerous policy proposals and general recommendations, the importance 
of media plurality, media freedom and competition is emphasized. Nonetheless, the knowledge as 
to how effective media and a free press actually perform to combat corruption is still limited, albeit 
growing. 
This working paper demonstrates that research on the relationship between press freedom and 
corruption is far from fulfilled, and that additional and new approaches are needed. In this chapter, 
we combine two different models of the relationship between press freedom and corruption and 
bring forward more and improved data. We include multiple indicators and subcomponents of 
press freedom, and a number of different measures of corruption. In addition, we apply a new es-
timation technique called fixed effects vector decomposition (FEVD) to analyze our data. FEVD is similar 
to a statistical "three-stage rocket" which among other things can handle known problems that arise 
when estimating models with time-invariant or almost time-invariant variables correlated with unit 
effects (Plümper & Troeger 2007). Similar techniques have not yet been applied in previous re-
search on the relationship between press freedom and corruption. Thus, our application will serve 
as a robustness test of earlier findings.  
This working paper will revise the contemporary research regarding press freedom and corruption, 
and additionally bring forward newer data and a different method to examine the relationship. In 
consequence of this, the results will hopefully highlight new and interesting findings that will act as 
a stepping-stone for future research. 
Press freedom and Corruption 
The concept of press freedom is widely debated in the literature of mass communication. Early 
definitions reflect post-Second World War geopolitical constructions, and primarily focus on free-
dom from government control (see e.g., Lowenstein 1970, Weaver 1977, Picard 1985, Hachten 
1987, Hagen 1992). Subsequently, definitions of the concept differentiate between a classical liberal 
perspective on media freedom ? that media should serve to protect the individual from the abuse 
of the state ? and a more radical democratic perspective ? media should seek to equalize the imbal-
ances in society between the degree of freedom and independence enjoyed by the media, and the 
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degree of freedom enjoyed by the citizens in the access to media content (see e.g., Curran 1996, 
Price 2002, McQuail 2005).  
??????????????????????????????????????????availability of information are   important underlying assump-
tions and crucial determinants for the efficiency of economic markets. Analogous assumptions are 
being made concerning political markets. For instance, citizens require information to become 
knowledgeable in order to make intelligent choices regarding their voting. Economists have increas-
ingly emphasized the crucial role played by information in order to avoid market failures and for 
achieving efficient allocations of resources (Stiglitz 2000). The principal-agent framework, com-
monly used by both economists and political scientists, is defined by the asymmetry of information 
between principal and agent (Besley & Burgess 2002, Aidt 2003, Coyne & Leeson 2004, Miller 
2005, Teorell 2007, Lindstedt & Naurin 2010). In this case, the principals are typically citi-
zens/voters and the agents are politicians/bureaucrats. The origins of corruption, in this type of 2-
model, can be traced back to an information asymmetry where the agent has an information ad-
vantage over the principal.1 A free press is supposed to contribute to more transparency and a freer 
flow of information which will decrease the information asymmetry. 
Theoretically, causes and determinants of corruption can be found in a variety of characteristics of 
???????????????????, political, and social systems. Treisman (2000) ??????????????????????????????i-
cials are balancing expected costs of a corrupt act against the expected benefits ??????????????????????i-
cal traditions might affect the perceived costs and benefits of corrupt actions (see e.g., Root 1996, 
Rothstein 2007). The most obvious cost is the risk of getting caught and punished. For a number of 
reasons, the risk of exposure and getting caught is assumed to be larger where free media is able to 
provide citizens with impartial and sufficient information, and independently scrutinizes holders of 
political power (see e.g., Norris 2000, Zaller 2003, Norris 2006). Besides its apparent impact on 
democracy, economic development increases the spread of education, literacy, and depersonalized 
relationships. Thus, it can be concluded that corruption is likely to be less occurring in democratic 
and more economically developed countries with a freer press and where populations are more 
educated and literate.  
However, the probability of getting caught also depends on the effectiveness of a ?????????? legal 
system. First, legal systems differ in the degree of protection and the opportunity for recourse they 
offer to private property owners harmed by corrupt acts by officials, and additionally differ in the 
formulations and original intents of laws ? common law systems and civil law systems (see e.g., David & 
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Brierly 1985, La Porta et al. 1999, Treisman 2000).2 Another difference is in the prevailing expecta-
tions and practices that preside over how they are enforced ? what Treisman terms as legal culture. 
Second, the procedural aspects of laws also differ across countries. Treisman claims that, in Britain 
and some of its former colonies, the focus is on the social role of law and the relative importance 
of law in preserving social order. In other cultures, social order is not so much associated with ad-
herence to procedures as with hierarchy and the authority of offices. Thus, one might expect coun-
tries with different colonial traditions to have different legal cultures ? and different degrees of 
susceptibility to corruption ? irrespectively of whether they have common law or civil law systems.3 
Based on this reasoning, one can expect that in countries with common law systems (especially 
Britain and its former colonies), the legal system is more efficient and the corruption level is lower. 
Another way in which ??????????? ??????????? ????????? might affect the perceived costs of corrupt 
actions is through the influence of religion. Treisman (2000) argues that religious traditions often 
have been thought to condition cultural attitudes towards s?????? ?????????????????????? ??????r-
??????????????????? Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Islam ? dominate, challenges to office-holders 
might be rarer than in cultures shaped by more egalitarian or individualistic religions, such as Prot-
estantism. Nevertheless, religion can also affect corruption levels in the different relational settings 
between church and state. In religious traditions such as in Protestantism, institutions of the church 
may play a role in monitoring and denouncing the abuse of power by state officials. In other tradi-
tions ? such as in Islam ? where church and state hierarchies are closely intertwined, such a role 
may be uncommon (see e.g., La Porta et al. 1997, Treisman 2000, Serra 2004). This reasoning im-
plies that corruption is likely to be less common in countries with a Protestant tradition. 
An equally complicated set of factors might be the expected benefits from corruption, which a 
rational official would balance against the expected costs. With the wording of Daniel Treisman: 
?Most corrupt acts involve a bargain between the official and some private actor. The official uses 
the powers of office to create concentrated gains for the private partner beyond those he could 
earn without state intervention? (Treisman, 2000: 405). State actions, such as regulation and taxa-
tion, may be used to give the partner advantages over rivals in the market, and in return, the official 
receives a part of the profit.  
Several factors affect the scale of profits the official can create for his/her partner by intervening in 
the market. Most obviously, there is a positive correlation between state control of the economy 
and the extent of corruption ? the larger the state and the greater the extent of state control, the 
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greater the availability of options for corruption (Tanzi, 1994). Second, the ability of an official to 
provide a private partner profitable protection in some domestic market, will depend on ???????????
openness to trade and external competition from imports (see e.g., Mauro 1995, Ades & Di Tella 
1999, Treisman 2000). From this it can be concluded that corruption is likely to be lower in demo-
cratic and more economically developed countries with a freer press and where the citizens are 
more educated and literate, but also that historical aspects are very important determinants of cor-
ruption. 
If we take a look at the previous empirical studies on press freedom and corruption, the main pic-
ture presents a clear correlation between these two variables (Ahrend 2002, Brunetti & Weder 2003, 
Staphenhurst 2004, Chowdhury 2004, Norris 2004, Macdonell & Pesic 2006, Freille et al. 2007, 
Olken & Barron 2009, Lessmann & Markwardt 2010). Common indicators, such as newspaper 
circulation (Besley & Burgess 2002, Adserà et al. 2003, Pellegrini & Gerlagh 2008), media owner-
ship (Besley & Prat 2001, Djankov et al. 2003) and media competition (Suphachalasai 2005), show 
strong and robust direct effects on levels of corruption, also with alternative measurements and 
when additional important explanatory variables are being accounted for. However, it is important 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????r-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????abilities to actually kick the rascals 
out (political accountability) (see e.g. Lindstedt & Naurin 2010). 
One of the most ambitious and rigorous research efforts regarding the relationship of press free-
dom and corruption is that of Brunetti and Weder (2003), where they use alternative measures for 
both the independent and dependent variable, and where several robustness checks are performed 
(they test two different press freedom indexes and four different measures of corruption, across 
countries as well as over time). The results show significant positive effects of press freedom on 
three of the four corruption control indices, whereby they conclude that in countries where the 
media is reasonably free from any kind of restriction concerning their activities, corruption levels 
are likely to be low. Importantly, Brunetti and Weder also address and refute the suspicion that 
there could be a potential endogeneity problem involved with respect to the causality between press 
freedom and corruption, this stemming from the incentives for corrupt governments to restrict 
press freedom (see e.g., Norris 2006, Sussman 2001).  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? in the 
case of Indonesia it would mean a reduction in corruption to the level of Singapore, for the Russian 
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Federation it would imply reaching the corruption level of the Slovak Republic, and for Nigeria the 
level of Belgium.???????????????????? ????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????? ????
nature of the relationship in previous studies. However, high levels of press freedom are not a 
quick fix. Instead, reforms focusing on press freedom should, just as Lindstedt and Naurin (2010) 
argue if we are to see any effects of diminished corruption, be accompanied by measures for 
strengthening citizens????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
illustration of how a thorough elaboration of the focal relationship can qualify for our understand-
ings of causal mechanisms. Their claim, which is substantiated by empirical results, is that just mak-
ing information available will not prevent corruption unless there are favorable conditions already 
in place for publicity and accountability, i.e. media circulation, free and fair elections, and an educated 
electorate. 
 
Furthermore, Lindstedt and Naurin attempt to develop the oversimplified principal-agent model. 
They argue that we cannot take for granted that transparent information regarding the agent will 
always reach the principal no matter how available or accessible the information is, and that econ-
omists have failed to acknowledge that there are costs involved in obtaining information. Lack of 
???????????????? ????????????????????????????????????bilities to process the information, can hinder a 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????c-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
   
Lederman, Loayza, and Soares (2005), explore the link between political institutions and corruption, 
and argue for the relevance of explanatory variables unique to corruption. The results show that 
corruption tends to decrease systematically with democracy, parliamentary systems, democratic 
stability, and press freedom. Additionally, the decrease survives the inclusion of the different sets of 
controls, with the exception of the press freedom variable, which captures the effect of economic 
development on corruption. The result is also interesting by signifying the only previous empirical 
study of the relationship between press freedom and corruption that indicates insignificant results.  
An additional study demonstrating the necessity of estimating interaction effects in explanatory 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????a-
tion on corruption. ????????? ??????????????????? ?????????????? ???? ????tionship depends on press 
freedom. He notes that a high degree of press freedom acts as a channel through which education 
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decreases corruption. Only in countries where press freedom is well developed, is there a positive 
effect of education on corruption. The causal direction, according to his work, runs from a freer 
press to lower corruption and is a further example of elaboration which leads to improved or nu-
anced policy recommendations.  
Lessman and Markwardt (2010) investigate the relationship between decentralization and corrup-
tion and whether public monitoring, reflected by press freedom, has an impact on the influence of 
decentralization on corruption. Their major finding is that benefits of decentralization in develop-
ing countries only occur if there is a supervisory body that strengthens the accountability of bu-
reaucrats, with the freedom of the press as one such possible institution ? decentralization counter-
acts corruption in countries with a high degree of press freedom, while countries with a low degree 
of press freedom suffer from decentralization (Lessman & Markwardt, 2010: 632). 
While many studies of the relationship between press freedom and corruption have dedicated sub-
stantial empirical contributions to the economic side of the openness?corruption nexus (trade, 
trade barriers, capital freedom, and so forth), the analysis of Charron (2009) gives further insight 
into other components of globalization. Charron examines the relationship between two non-trade 
forms of international openness (social and political) and corruption while taking into account the 
??????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(socio-political openness) are conditioned by domestic institutions (the level of press freedom) 
concerning their impact on government corruption. The analysis shows empirically that socio-
political openness (i.e. openness to trade, international organizations, social flows of information) 
has little to no impact on corruption in the absence of press freedom. Additionally, while the em-
pirical evidence suggests that political and social openness have a significant impact in fighting cor-
ruption given a free press, the impact of such international forces are negligible in cases where the 
level of press freedom is low. 
Finally, Chowdhury (2004) presents a concise treatment of the topic. The objective is similar to 
Brunetti and Weder (2003), although Chowdhury also incorporates the effects of democracy on 
corruption. In his view, media's role as an informative device and the standing of democracy acting 
as a punishing mechanism, should both help towards restraining corruption. The empirical findings 
of the paper support this conclusion. Both press freedom and democracy are powerful and signifi-
cant controls on corruption and this result is robust in different settings. 
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While all these studies (with one exception) reach the same basic conclusion ? that press freedom is 
good news for corruption control ? nearly all studies use an aggregate measure of press freedom, 
most of them focus on direct effects only, and do relatively little in matters of testing for sensitivity 
to changes in the set of conditioning variables.  
In the most elaborate and complete analysis of the relationship between press freedom and corrup-
tion, Freille, Haque and Kneller (2007) also come to the same general conclusion regarding the 
effects of press freedom on corruption. Although, in addition to testing for the robust relationship 
between the aggregate press freedom and corruption, Freille et al. use previously unexplored data 
concerning different forms of restrictions on press freedom. Additionally, their study entails a large 
time-series cross-section regression analysis in combination with an extreme bounds analysis (EBA) 
accompanied by the use of instrumental variables (IV) to test the robustness and the direction of 
causality of the relationship between press freedom and corruption. The results verify a close rela-
tionship between press freedom and bureaucratic corruption control, thus confirming the findings 
of earlier research. In their models, they control for a wide set of variables found consistently relat-
ed to corruption also in previous empirical studies (see fc Treisman 2000). 
The Freille et al. study also confirms that analyses of subcomponents of inclusive press freedom indi-
ces are fruitful enterprises in pushing the research forward with regard to pinning down what 
mechanisms are driving the relationship. Interestingly, their analyses reveal that the subcomponent 
laws and regulations from the popular Freedom House ? Freedom of the Press index (see description 
in appendix) fails to qualify as robust, while the two other subcomponents ? political and economic 
pressures on the press ? prove to be robust to changes in model specifications. In other words, the 
results suggest that it is the political environment and economical environment (in that order), and not laws 
and regulations that drive the strong relationship between press freedom and corruption. The authors 
thus conclude that the improvements in certain categories of press freedom can have an important 
impact on corruption. Hence, reducing political influence on the media may be the most effective 
way to reduce corruption levels (Freille et al. 2007).  
To summarize, all studies mentioned, with one important exception, reach the same basic conclu-
sion: the importance of a free press in curbing corruption will ?????????? ?????????????????????????l-
ity to information which in turn will make it more difficult for politicians and public servants to 
cover up, or get away with, corrupt behavior. In this working paper, we attempt to combine the 
approaches found in earlier research simultaneously in order to present a complete account of the 
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relationship between press freedom and corruption. Our ambition is to pursue the approaches in 
previous research and perform systematic robustness tests such as the use of multiple indicators 
and composite measures of press freedom and corruption, as well as error bounds analysis applied 
by Freille, Haque and Kneller. In addition, we want to elaborate the relationship further by intro-
ducing the subcomponents of press freedom (Freille et al 2007), as well as interaction variables 
conditioning the focal relationship (Lindstedt & Naurin 2010). Lastly, we aim to apply new estima-
tion techniques that can remedy some of the well-known estimation problems present in analyses 
of time-series cross-section data (Plümper & Troeger 2007). 
Data and method 
The overall purpose of our empirical analyses is to check the robustness of findings from earlier 
studies of the relationship between press freedom and corruption. The general strategy applied in 
all the analyses include 1) replication with an expanded number of observations, 2) the use of three 
different measures of corruption, and 3) the application of new estimation techniques that are tai-
lored to handle estimation problems that arise from having many time-invariant variables when 
modeling regressions.  
1) Replication 
Regarding the replications, we will reanalyze explanatory models of corruption from two earlier 
studies, Freille et al. (2007) and Lindstedt & Naurin (2010). These two studies are selected for being 
among the most elaborated analyses of the relationship between press freedom and corruption. In 
???? ?????? ????? ??? ???? ?????????? ?????????????????? ???????????? ??? ?????? ?????????????????? ??? ?? ?????????
point. The idea is to, as closely as pos??????? ?????????????????? ??? ?????? ??????????????????? ??????????
observations. 
With reference to the base model, nearly all the variables used as control variables in the study of 
Freille et al. are included, but with more extensive year spans.4 These variables portray among other 
things political rights, freedom from government intervention, democracy over time, as well as 
several dummies captu???????????????????torical characteristics as well as present ones (see detailed 
information concerning the variables in the attached appendix). Taken altogether, the number of 
observations in our analysis is a great deal larger (in the range of 831 to 1 283 observations) than in 
the Freille et al. study (approximately 487 observations). Regarding the main independent variable, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??
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span: 1994-2006 in comparison to 1994-2004. 
In the second part of the empirical analyses, we are inspired by the models estimated in Lindstedt 
???????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? plicity 
compared to the very large model of Freille, Haque and Kneller. Originally, Lindstedt and Naurin 
estimated their model on cross sectional data. Here, we will expand the number of observations 
considerably by estimating the Lindstedt and Naurin model on time-series cross-section data for 
the time span running from 1960 to 2009, from between 81-110 observations to 662-859 observa-
tions. Note however, our application of the Lindstedt and Naurin model is not an exact replication 
of their original cross-sectional only model. 
2) Multiple indicators of corruption 
For the purpose of additional robustness checks, we let three highly correlated but different 
measures of corruption enter as dependent variables in the regression models one at the time: 
???????????? ???????????? ??????? ????? ?????parency International (1995-??????? ????????? ?????
??????????????????????????????????????????-?????????????????????????????????????????????????
Bank (1996-??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????p-
????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????? ??????
(highly clean) to 0-??? ?????????????? ????????? ????? ???????????? ???? ????? ????????????? ????? ??
(highly corrupt) to 100 (highly clean) to 0-????????????????????????????????????????? ??????? ???
standardized with the mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1 each year of measurement. With this 
coding, we expect a positive and significant relationship between press freedom and corruption: the 
freer the press, the cleaner the country. 
All three measures of corruption originate from credible sources and are used regularly in empirical 
analyses of corruption. They all claim to assess variations of the incidence of corruption within and 
between countries.5 A scatter plot of the focal relationship between press freedom and the Trans-
parency International measure of corruption, using the time-series cross-section data that we have 
chosen to analyze, typically shows a curvilinear bivariate relationship between press freedom and 
corruption: moving towards a freer press becomes more important for reducing corruption levels 
in countries with relatively high levels of press freedom to begin with.6 
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FIGURE 1, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND CORRUPTION (TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL 
CORRUPTION PERCEPTION INDEX). 
 
Ex????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????r-
rup??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Libya and Turkmenistan. Scoring a value of a lower level of corruption, and as well a higher level of 
press freedom, are countries like Zimbabwe and Jordan. Countries with low levels of corruption 
and a high level of press freedom are for example Finland, Canada and Austria. An outlier scoring 
low levels of corruption but with merely a medium level of a free press is Singapore, and an outlier 
with the opposite scenario ? a high level of corruption but with a medium-high level of a free press, 
is characterized by Bangladesh. 
3) New estimation technique 
The robustness check with the highest potential to alter what we know about the relationship be-
tween press freedom and corruption is the rerun of the previous studies with a new estimation 
technique that can handle problems that arise from having many time-invariant variables in the 
model. All analyses will be performed using both a standard OLS method and a new estimation 
technique called fixed effects vector decomposition (FEVD) ? an estimation technique that is more or less 
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tailored for data analyses of time-series cross-section data enclosing many time-invariant variables 
(Plümper & Troeger 2007). Plümper and Troeger show that if a variable has low within-country 
variation and large between-country variation ? which is typically the case in this type of time-series 
cross-section data ? treating the variable as time-invariant in a FEVD-model gives more efficient 
and less biased point estimates.7 
We believe the proposed estimation procedure has a large potential of altering the understanding of 
the relationship between press freedom and corruption, as it has been shown to generate new find-
ings that do not match with earlier results in studies of e.g. human well-being (Boyce 2009), crime 
(Worrall 2008), trade and foreign direct investments (Márquez-Ramos 2008), deficit spending 
(Schneider 2008), bureaucratic efficiency (Dahlström et al. 2010), and public policies (Plümper & 
Schneider 2007).   
In the coming analyses, twenty-??????? ?????????????? ????????? ???????????????????? ??????????????????
been identified as time-invariant using the rule of thumb provided by Plümper and Troeger.7 Our 
democracy over time variable con??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
index 1972-2009, and consequently this variable is also defined as time-invariant since the within 
country variation is zero. The stationary dummy-variables for legal origin, colonial heritage, and 
religion are all time-invariant by definition (see appendix for details). 
???? ???????????? ????????? ??? ???? ?????? ??????? ????? ???????? ?????? ???????? ?????? ???-
components portraying the legal, political and economic aspects of the phenomenon. In previous 
research, elaborations including the subcomponents have shown that it is mainly the political and 
economic subcomponents that drive the focal relationship while laws and regulations result in insignifi-
cant values. In the final analyses of the paper, we demonstrate what occurs in the regressions when 
the subcomponents of press freedom are estimated simultaneously with the global index of press 
freedom. 
Robust effects of press freedom on corruption 
Does the robust relationship between press freedom and corruption change when we add observa-
tions, apply multiple indicators of corruption, and take into account that many of the standard de-
terminants of corruption are time-invariant? Our results of the elaborated analyses show that the 
answer is no ? the focal relationship remains robust and significant: The freer the press the cleaner the 
country.  
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In table 1, we display three comparisons of the two estimation techniques, one for each measure of 
corruption. As expected from previous research, there are significant direct linear effects of press 
freedom on all measures of corruption in the OLS-models 1, 3, and 5. For instance, the results 
from table 1 suggest that ceteris paribus moving from minimum (0) to maximum (100) on the FH 
Press Freedom index (model 1) will produce a change of .40 in our Corruption Perception Index 
(0-1). The estimated effects are robust across all three measurements of corruption. More im-
portantly, when we expose the focal relationship for the alternative estimation technique, the ef-
fects of press freedom remain significant and robust across all three measurements. 
TABLE 1, MODELING THE EFFECTS OF PRESS FREEDOM ON CORRUPTION (POOLED OLS AND 
FEVD, UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS) 
 Corruption 
Perceptions 
Index OLS 
(1) 
Corruption 
Perceptions 
Index FEVD 
(2) 
Freedom from 
corruption OLS 
(3) 
Freedom from 
corruption FEVD 
(4) 
Control of 
corruption OLS 
(5) 
Control of 
corruption FEVD 
(6) 
Time-Invariant variables 
   Freedom of the Press (0-100) 
 
0.004*** 
 
0.004*** 
 
0.002*** 
 
0.002** 
 
0.015*** 
 
0.015*** 
   Trade -0.001 -0.001 0.002*** 0.002** -0.000 -0.001 
   Imports 0.003*** 0.003* -0.004*** -0.003** 0.005 0.007 
   Fuel -0.001*** -0.001** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
   Log of GDP 0.106*** 0.110*** 0.104*** 0.107*** 0.420*** 0.434*** 
   Parliamentary system (0/1) 0.005 0.016 0.041* 0.049 0.110 0.154 
   Presidential system (0/1) -0.001 0.000 0.048** 0.050 0.046 0.061 
   Maj. Electoral system (0/1) 0.011 0.008 0.048*** 0.046** 0.029 0.017 
   Political Rights 0.020*** 0.017* -0.007 -0.009 0.022 0.011 
   Military Expenditure (% of GDP)      0.005 0.009 -0.005 -0.002 0.030** 0.047** 
   Former French Colony 0.015 0.031 0.040** 0.045 0.103 0.137 
   Former Spanish Colony -0.002 -0.016 0.018 0.005 -0.231*** -0.292* 
   Former British Colony -0.072*** -0.047 0.026 0.039 -0.116 -0.040 
   Ever a colony 0.001 -0.020 -0.078*** -0.086* -0.111 -0.166 
   English legal tradition 0.053*** 0.040 0.079** -0.025 -0.032 -0.078 
   Socialist legal tradition -0.199*** -0.197*** -0.127*** -0.221*** -0.836*** -0.838*** 
   French legal tradition -0.057*** -0.055 -0.014 -0.108** -0.218** -0.214 
   German legal tradition 0.000  0.094**  0.000  
   Scandinavian legal tradition 0.082*** 0.104 0.000 -0.083 0.256** 0.344 
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   Catholicism as dominant religion -0.054*** -0.041 -0.015 -0.006 -0.160*** -0.117 
   Protestantism as dominant religion 0.083*** 0.083 0.207*** 0.208** 0.240*** 0.227 
   Democracy over time 0.002 0.002 -0.015*** -0.015* -0.001 0.000 
Time-Variant variable 
   Freedom from Government 
 
-0.001*** 
 
0.000 
 
-0.001*** 
 
-0.000 
 
-0.005*** 
 
0.001 
Residuals  1.000  1.000  1.000 
Constant -0.689*** -0.836*** -0.413*** -0.417*** -3.976*** -4.524*** 
Observations 929 929 1283 1283 831 831 
R2 0.856 0.976 0.710 0.880 0.865 0.978 
Note: ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????? 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????economic development main-
tain significant values through all six models. The results also confirm the by far strongest and most 
consistent finding of earlier research showing that lower perceived corruption correlates closely 
with higher economic development. However, some of the other time-invariant variables are no 
longer statistically significant when applying an alternative estimation technique. In models 1 and 2, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????tural char-
acteristics where, contrary to what one would expect, most of the covariates become insignificant 
when applying FEVD, which may of course be due to the moderately high correlations among 
them. Nevertheless, the socialist legal tradition covariate retains its significant value through all six 
???????? ?????????? ?? ???? ??? ???? ????????????? ??? ????????? ?????? ???????? ???? ??????????? ??????????
????????????????? ???? ?????????? ?? ???? ??? ???? ???????? ???? ?????? ???? ?????????? ???????????? ????????????
Lastly, in all models, the FEVD procedure fails to retain significant values of the time-variant co-
variate freedom from government.  
In table 2, we estimate a much smaller model inspired by Lindstedt and Naurin (2010). In their 
model they estimate the effects of rule of law using a measure from UNDP, which undoubtedly is 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
into account, there are still effects of freedom of the press and level of democracy. 
Recall that in this model, press freedom is modelled to interact with levels of democracy. The OLS 
effects of press freedom, levels of democracy and the interaction term on corruption levels are all 
highly significant for models 1 and 5. The interaction effect (FP x DoT) is particularly strong;; in 
fact, although the coefficients for Freedom of the Press (FP) and Democracy over time (DoT) both 
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have negative signs, the combined effect of the three variables become positive for all countries that 
score very high on both press freedom and levels of democracy.  
TABLE 2, PRESS FREEDOM AND CORRUPTION (POOLED OLS AND FEVD, UNSTANDARDIZED 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS). 
       
 Corruption 
Perceptions 
Index 
OLS 
(1) 
Corruption 
Perceptions 
Index 
FEVD 
(2) 
Freedom 
from corrupt-
ion 
OLS 
(3) 
Freedom 
from corrupt-
ion 
FEVD 
(4) 
 
Control of 
corruption 
OLS 
(5) 
 
Control of 
corruption 
FEVD 
(6) 
Time-Invariant variables 
   Freedom of the Press (FP) 
 
-0.003*** 
 
0.001 
 
-0.000 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.006*** 
 
-0.007 
   Former British Colony 0.008 -0.026 0.043*** 0.055 0.008 0.017 
   Trade 0.000 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
   Democracy over time (DoT) -0.021*** 0.024 0.000 -0.005 -0.049*** -0.046 
Time-Variant variables 
   Rule of Law 
   Energy Use    
 
0.181*** 
0.000 
 
0.249*** 
0.000 
 
0.182*** 
0.000 
 
0.313*** 
-0.000** 
 
0.862*** 
-0.000 
 
0.966*** 
-0.000 
   GDP 
   Interaction effect (FP x DoT) 
0.000*** 
0.000*** 
0.000 
-0.000 
0.000*** 
0.000 
-0.000 
0.000 
0.000*** 
0.001*** 
0.000 
0.001 
Residuals 
Constant 
 
0.469*** 
1.000 
0.353*** 
 
0.379*** 
1.000 
0.569*** 
 
0.134** 
1.000 
0.258 
Observations 662 662 829 829 859 859 
R2 0.892 0.980 0.775 0.894 0.944 0.982 
Note: ????????????????????? ??????????? ?????????????? ???????????? ??????????????? ???????????????? ?? ??????? ??????????? ???? ??????????? 
effect between these two variables when testing for other factors of corruption. More elaborate descriptions of the variables can be found 
??? ?????????????? ??? ?????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????? ??????????????????????most 
?????????p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
As mentioned earlier, the freedom of the press measurement from Freedom House encloses three 
subcomponents representing the legal, political and economical aspects of the phenomenon. Esti-
mations of the effects of the subcomponents can inform us further about the relationship between 
press freedom and corruption. Prior elaborations including the subcomponents have shown that it 
is mainly the political and economic subcomponents that drive the focal relationship, while laws 
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and regulations that influence media content turns out insignificant. In table 3, we demonstrate 
what happens in the regressions when the subcomponents of press freedom are estimated simulta-
neously. 
TABLE 3, PRESS FREEDOM SUBCOMPONENTS AND CORRUPTION (POOLED OLS AND FEVD, 
UNSTANDARDIZED REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS) 
       
 Corruption Per-
ceptions Index 
OLS 
(1) 
Corruption 
Perceptions 
Index 
FEVD 
(2) 
 
Freedom from 
corruption 
OLS 
(3) 
 
Freedom from 
corruption 
FEVD 
(4) 
 
Control of 
corruption 
OLS 
(5) 
 
Control of 
corruption 
FEVD 
(6) 
Time-Invariant variables 
   Freedom of the Press (FP) 
 
-0.001 
 
0.002 
 
-0.003** 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.007*** 
 
-0.006 
   Former British Colony 
   Trade 
   Democracy over time (DoT) 
Time-Variant variables 
0.008 
0.000 
   -0.021*** 
 
-0.025 
0.000 
0.023 
     
     0.042*** 
-0.000 
-0.002 
 
       0.051 
       0.000 
      -0.009 
 
     0.006 
    -0.000 
  -0.052*** 
 
0.016 
-0.000 
-0.045 
 
   Laws and regulations that             
   Influence media content 
 
-0.000 
 
-0.000 
   
  0.001** 
 
0.001 
 
      0.000 
 
-0.000 
   Political pressures and      
   controls on media content 
   
   -0.001*** 
 
-0.001 
 
0.001 
        
      -0.000 
 
     -0.001 
 
-0.000 
   Economic influences over    
   media content 
 
-0.000 
 
0.000 
 
0.000 
 
       0.001 
 
     0.000 
 
-0.001 
   Rule of Law      0.184***     0.249***     0.186***    0.318***    0.864***     0.982*** 
   GDP   0.000** 0.000     0.000***       -0.000    0.000***      0.000 
   Energy Use  0.000 0.000 0.000   -0.000***     -0.000 -0.000 
   Interaction effect (FP x DoT) 
Residuals 
   0.000*** -0.000 
1.000 
0.000        0.000 
1.000 
   0.001***      0.001 
1.000 
Constant    0.479***     0.361***     0.383***    0.581***   0.142** 0.293 
Observations 662 662 829 829 859 859 
R2 0.893 0.980 0.778 0.895 0.944 0.982 
Note: ????????????????????? ??????????? ?????????????? ???????????? ??????????????? ???????????????? ?? ??????? ??????????? ???? ??????????? 
effect between these two variables when testing for the factors of corruption. More elaborate descriptions of the variables can be found in 
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????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
As shown in table 3, when we estimate the subcomponents simultaneously, the same pattern shown 
in table 2 occurs yet again. The significant effect of the freedom of the press measure is absorbed 
by the rule of law variable. When using pooled OLS, a significant relationship between press free-
dom and two of the corruption estimates remains. However, including the subcomponents do not 
confirm findings from previous research ? that mainly the political and economic subcomponents 
drive the focal relationship. Instead, we find only small significant effects of legal and political as-
pects on the focal relationship (model 1 and model 2). 
The interaction effect remains unchanged when the subcomponents are included. This means that 
the effect of press freedom on corruption starts off negative or insignificant for countries with very 
low levels of democracy, and becomes more positive the more democratic a country is. In other 
words, results confirm that there is a curvilinear relationship between freedom of the press and 
corruption. This finding can be illustrated by plotting the relationship between press freedom and 
corruption separately for four countries with different levels of democracy (see Figure 2). 
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FIGURE 2, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRESS FREEDOM AND CORRUPTION AT FOUR DIF-
FERENT LEVELS OF DEMOCRACY 
 
Note: The figures show the focal relationship separately for four groups of countries depending on the level of democ-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-2009).  
Figure 2 reveals how the relationship between press freedom and corruption is portrayed. At a low 
level of democracy, the relationship is slightly positive carrying small effects. This pattern is sus-
tained even with higher levels of democracy, although slowly advancing towards a positive relation-
ship. Not until the democracy level reaches high levels, is there a strong and positive relationship 
between press freedom and corruption. The relationship is thus J-??????????????????????????????a-
tionship between our dependent and independent variables in countries with low levels of democ-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????s-
ing a high level of corruption but a medium-level of press freedom. Chile is portrayed as the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? presented, we find for exam-
ple Finland and Iceland at the top, whereas Portugal portrays a country at the bottom. 
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Conclusions 
The justification for the analyses of this working paper was to summarize and robustness test the 
findings from earlier studies of the relationship between press freedom and corruption. We have 
replicated prior analyses with an expanded number of observations. Additionally, we have rerun the 
analyses with three different indicators of corruption and with a new estimation technique. We  
obtain  results  that  largely  confirm  earlier  findings  from  the  studies  we  replicated. 
The results stress the importance of looking beyond the simple models of direct effects of press 
freedom and the level of corruption, as the relationship seems to be more complicated than that. 
We wish to underline that the curvilinear relationship noted by numerous scholars seems best mod-
elled with an interaction between the level of electoral democracy and the level of press freedom 
(which was also observed in figure 1). The results suggest that the role of a free press in fighting 
corruption differs depending on whether the country at play has a well, newly, or non-established 
electoral democracy: among the well-established electoral democracies, the level of press freedom is 
very important for the ability to fight corruption. Among the newly established democracies, the 
level of press freedom is less important and, maybe most notably, among countries with weak elec-
toral democracy, the level of press freedom has a relatively small impact in fighting corruption. 
Instead, a hierarchy of needs becomes evident. These countries are rather in need of things like a 
well-functioning legal system before they can indulge in luxury such as a free and independent 
press.  
 
Notes 
1 Corruption ordinarily refers to the use of public office for private gains, where an official (the 
agent) entrusted with carrying out a task by the public (the principal) engages in some sort of mal-
feasance for private enrichment which is difficult to monitor for the principal (Bardhan 1997). 
2 La Porta et al. (1999) hypothesize that the greater protections of property against the state embod-
ied in common law systems, improve various aspects of government performance, including reduc-
ing corruption. 
3 Treisman (2000) argues that legal system and colonial experience are highly correlated, but also 
considers that the overlap is not perfect. He argues that some former British colonies or mandates 
do not have a common law legal system: for instance, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait, Malta and Mauri-
tius. And some countries that were never British colonies have nevertheless adopted common law 
systems, in whole or in part: Thailand, Western Samoa, Liberia, and Namibia. 
4 The variables included in the models that appear in the first part of the empirical analyses are 
identical to Freille et al. (2007) except for the level of democracy. Since the level of democracy vari-
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able was not possible to replicate from the original data, we have constructed a functional equiva-
lent (see appendix for details). 
5 The three measures of corruption show impressive covariation (Pearsons r=.86-.97). 
6 Typically, a scatterplot of press freedom and corruption also reveals a number of outliers. Exam-
ples of countries scoring a high level ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????b-
ya. Scoring a value of a lower level of corruption, and as well a higher level of press freedom, are 
countries like Italy, Zimbabwe and Jordan. Countries with low levels of corruption and a high level 
of press freedom are for example Finland, Canada and Austria. An outlier scoring low levels of 
corruption but with merely a medium level of a free press is Singapore, and an outlier with the op-
posite scenario ? a high level of corruption but with a medium-high level of a free press, is charac-
terized by Bangladesh. 
7 The FEVD estimation proceeds in three stages: 1) in the first stage, the procedure runs a pure FE 
model on the baseline model to obtain an estimate of the unit effects. 2) In the second stage, the 
unit effects are decomposed into an explained and unexplained part (the error term of the second 
stage) by regressing the unit effects on the time-invariant explanatory variables of the original mod-
el. 3) Finally, the third stage estimates the original model by pooled OLS-regression, including the 
time-invariant variables and the error term of the second stage (eta). 
8 A prerequisite for successfully applying FEVD is to define whether variables are time-invariant or 
??????? ???????????????? ??? ?????? ???? ????? ??? ?????? ?????????? ??? ???????? ???? ?????????? ???????
simulations. To determine whether a variable is time-invariant, calculations are performed to obtain 
the quota of the between country and within country standard deviation (bw-quota;; see appendix). 
If a greater part of the variation in an independent variable is between countries rather than across 
time within countries, the variable is a candidate for being defined as time-invariant. Plümper and 
Troeger demonstrate that the quota thresholds depend on the correlation between the independent 
variable and the dependent variable in the model. For independent variables where the correlation 
with the dependent variable is higher than .30, the variable is defined as time-invariant if the bw-
quota is higher than 1.7. If correlations are higher than .50 the bw-quota threshold is 2.8, and high-
er than .80 the bw-quota threshold is 3.8. For independents that correlate lower than .30 the rule of 
thumb is to define the variable as time invariant if the bw-quota is higher than 0.2. 
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APPENDIX 
Variable descriptions 
 
Name 
Variable 
name 
in data set Description N n Min Max Mean 
Std 
between 
Std 
within 
Cor r . 
with T I 
Cor r .  
with 
H F 
Cor r . 
with 
WB 
T &P(2007) 
Rule of 
Thumb 
threshold 
b/w  
ratio        
Defined as 
time-
invariant/ 
time-variant 
TI: Corruption 
Perceptions 
Index 
ti_cpi 
Corruption Perceptions 
Index, QoG-database: 
Transparency 
International, 1995-2009 
1 553 178 0 1 0.42 .21 .04 - - - - 5.14 - 
HF: Freedom 
from 
Corruption 
hf_corrupt 
Freedom from 
Corruption, QoG-
database: Heritage 
Foundation, 1994-2006 
1 949 163 0 1 .40 .25 .09 - - - - 2.73 - 
WB: Control of 
Corruption wbgi_cce 
Control of Corruption, 
QoG-database: World 
Bank,1996-2007 
1 653 189 -2.09 2.60 -.05 .98 .20 - - - - 4.9 - 
Freedom of the 
Press fh_press 
Freedom of the Press 
index, QoG-database: 
Freedom House, 1994-
2006 
2 189 
 
188 
 
0 100 53.53 23.99 6.35 .67 .59 .66 >2.8 3.79 Time-invariant 
Freedom of the 
Press ? Law fh_law 
Laws and regulations 
that influence media 
content, QoG-database: 
Freedom House,1994-
2006 
2 180 188 0 100 53.22 28.36 11.08 .58 .52 .58 >2.8 2.56 Time-variant 
Freedom of the 
press ? Political fh_pol 
Political pressures and 
controls on media 
content, QoG-database: 
Freedom House,1994-
2006 
2 181 188 0 100 58.73 21.39 9.78 .69 .55 .65 >2.8 2.39 Time-variant 
Freedom of the 
press ? 
Economic 
fh_econ 
Economic influences 
over media content, 
QoG-database: Freedom 
House,1994-2006 
2 181 188 0 100 58.29 19.42 11.09 
 
.58 
 
.50 .57 >2.8 1.75 Time-variant 
Military 
expenditure wdi_me 
Military expenditure (% 
of GDP), QoG-database: 
World Development 
Indicators, 1988-2007 
1 884 156 0 72.71 2.40 2.85 1.68 -.01 .01 .01 >0.2 1.70 Time-invariant 
Political rights fh_pr  
Political rights, QoG-
database: Freedom 
House, 1972-2008 
2 553 189 1 7 3.45 2.10 .60 -.59 -.52 -.61 >2.8 3.5 Time-invariant 
Freedom from 
government hf_govt  
Freedom from 
government, QoG-
database: Heritage 
Foundation, 1994-2006) 
1 949 163 0 99.13 67.14 20.76 8.68 -.52 -.28  -.39 >2.8 2.39 Time-variant 
Trade trade 
The sum of exports and 
imports of goods and 
services measured as a 
share of gross domestic 
product, World 
Development Indicators, 
1960-2009 
2 347 176 .31 456.65 86.30 47.19 14.18 
 
.19 
 
.18 .19 >0.2 3.33 Time-invariant 
Imports imports 
Imports of goods and 
services as % of GDP, 
World Development 
Indicators, 1960-2009 
2 347 176 .12 215.27 45.77 23.76 9.05 .11 .07 .12 >0.2 2.63 Time-invariant 
Fuel fuel 
% of fuel and mineral 
exports in merchandise 
exports, World 
Development Indicators, 
1960-2009 
1 912 167 0 99.74 15.57 27.36 6.13 -.22 -.07 -.19 >0.2 4.46 Time-invariant 
Logarithm of 
real GDP log_gdp 
The logarithm of real 
GDP per capita PPP, 
World Development 
Indicators, 1960-2009 
2 377 176 5.08 11.21 8.51 1.31 0.16  .77 
 
.71 
 
.76 >2.8 8.19 Time-invariant 
GDP gdp 
Real GDP per capita 
PPP, World 
Development  Indicators, 
1960-2009 
4 687 179 150.81 95434.18 9275.58 11168.35 
3050.5
8 .83 .76 .78 >3.8 3.66 Time-variant 
Energy use wdi_eu 
Energy Use (kg of coal 
equivalent per capita), 
QoG-database: World 
Development Indicators, 
1960-2005  
4 787 130 0 20140.45 2104.0 2383.75 924.92 .68 .63 .61 >2.8 2.58 Time-variant 
Rule of law wbgi_rle 
Rule of Law (Estimate), 
QoG-database: World 
Bank: Governance 
Indicators, 1996-2007 
1 689 192 -2.64 2.08 -.08 .98 .19 .93 .86 .94 >3.8 5.16 Time-invariant 
Interaction 
Freedom of the 
press x 
Democracy 
over time 
fh_press x 
afo_dem 
Freedom of the press 
index, QoG-database: 
Freedom House, 1994-
2006. Democracy over 
time, AFO, Freedom 
House 1972- 
2 439 192 0 590.97 191.94 80.76 34.99 .76 .64 .72 >2.8 2.31 Time-variant 
French colonial 
origin ffc 
French colonial origin 
(Dummy), QoG-
database: Hadenius & 
2 555 189 0 1 .14 .35 0 -.23 -.26 -.24  - Time-invariant 
Teorell, 2005 
Spanish 
colonial origin fsc 
Spanish colonial origin 
(Dummy), QoG-
database: Hadenius & 
Teorell, 2005 
2 555 189 0 1 .11 .30 0 -.15 -.11 -.11  - Time-invariant 
British colonial 
origin fbc  
British colonial origin 
(Dummy), QoG-
database: Hadenius & 
Teorell, 2005 
2 555 189 0 1 .29 .46 0   -.14 
 
.05 
 
.01  - Time-invariant 
Ever been a 
colony ever 
Ever been a colony 
(Dummy), QoG-
database: Hadenius & 
Teorell, 2005 
2 555 189 0 1 .63 .48 0  -.46 
 
-.34 
 
-.36  - Time-invariant 
Parliamentary 
regime type parl  
Parliamentary regime 
type (Dummy), QoG-
database: Database of 
Political Institutions, 
1975-2006 
2 072 175 0 1 .34 .47 .08 .58 .47 .54 >2.8 5.83 Time-invariant 
Presidential 
regime type pres  
Presidential regime type 
(Dummy), QoG-
database: Database of 
Political Institutions, 
1975-2006 
 
2 072 175 0 1 .57 .49 .10 -.49 -.33 -.45 >1.7 4.9 Time-invariant 
 
Majoritarian 
electoral rule 
 
dpi_plurality 
Majoritarian electoral 
rule (Dummy), QoG-
database:  Database of 
Political Institutions, 
1975-2006 
 
1 835 
 
161 
 
0 
 
1 
 
.66 
 
.47 
 
.07 
 
-.18 
 
-.08 
 
-.18 
 
>0.2 
 
6.71 
 
Time-invariant 
English legal 
origin eng 
English legal origin 
(Dummy), QoG-
database: La Porta et al, 
1999 
2 548 188 0 1 .31 .47 0 .09 .19 
 
.10 
 
 - Time-invariant 
Socialist legal 
origin soc 
Socialist legal origin 
(Dummy), QoG-
database: La Porta et al, 
1999 
2 548 188 0 1 .19 .39 0  -.23 
 
-.23 
 
-.21  - Time-invariant 
French legal 
origin fre  
French legal origin 
(Dummy), QoG-
database: La Porta et al, 
1999 
2 548 188 0 1 .43 .49 0  -.19 
 
-.21 
 
-.17  - Time-invariant 
German legal 
origin ger 
German legal origin 
(Dummy), QoG-
database: La Porta et al, 
1999 
2 548 188 0 1 .04 .19 0 .26 .29 .28  - Time-invariant 
Scandinavian sca Scandinavian legal 2 548 188 0 1 .03 .16 0 .45 .33 .39  - Time-invariant 
legal origin origin (Dummy), QoG-
database: La Porta et al, 
1999 
Protestant 
religion pro_d  
Protestant religion 
(Dummy), QoG-
database: La Porta et al, 
1980 
2 509 183 0 1 .04 .19 0 .44 .33 .36  - Time-invariant 
Catholic 
religion cat_d  
Catholic religion 
(Dummy), QoG-
database: La Porta et al, 
1980 
2 540 186 0 1 .24 .43 0 .01 .05 .10  - Time-invariant 
Democracy 
over time 
afo_dem  
(DoT) 
Democracy over time, 
AFO, Freedom House 
1972- 
2 555 189 .25 10 5.57 3.04 0 .66 .57 .65  - Time-invariant 
 
Note: The rule of thumb regarding the definition of time-invariant or time-variant variables has been applied by correlating the independent variables with the dependent variables. 
However, the Corruption Perceptions Index has acted as the main determinant when defining the variables as time-invariant/varian
Detailed descriptions of the press freedom and corruption indicators 
 
Independent variables: 
Acting as the independent factor in our study is consequently press freedom. The variable used 
portraying this factor is the press freedom measurement from Freedom House found in the QoG 
time-??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????? ??????
?????????? ?????????????? ?????? ???? ?????????????? ??? ??aws and regulations that influence media 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????? ???? ?????? ???? ???? ????????? ?????????????? ?????? ????? ?? ?????? ????????? ??? ??? ?????? ???
freedom), whereas the political subcategory ranges from 0 to 40. The press freedom index is 
computed by adding these three subcategories and thus measuring press freedom whether a country 
is rich or poor, or with cultural, ethnic and religious backgrounds. The variables run from 1994 until 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????? 
 
Dependent variables: 
Corruption acts accordingly as our dependent variable. In total, we use three different measurements 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(ti_cpi) from Transparency International, found in the QoG time-series database. The index defines 
corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain and focuses on the public sector. The 
measurement is based on a survey where perceptions of the degree of corruption by business people, 
risk analysts and the general public are compiled. The measurement runs from 1995 until 2009 and 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????, also found in 
the QoG time-??????? ?????????? ???? ????????? ??????? ??? ???? ???????????? ???????????? ??????? ?????
Transparency International and measures freedom from corruption in countries that are also listed in 
the Index of Economic Freedom. In this measurement, the scale ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 
(highly clean). The variable ranges from 1994-2006. The third variable measuring corruption is 
???????????????????????? ???????????? ????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????? ???
the QoG time-????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
measured through perceptions of corruption defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. 
The variable is an estimate with the mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Since the estimates are 
standardized each year of measurement, they are not directly suitable for over-time comparisons 
within countries. Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2006) however find no systematic time-trends in a 
selection of indicators that do allow for comparisons over time, which suggests that time-series 
information in the WBGI scores can be used if interpreted with caution. 
 
 
